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INTRODUCTION 
".. .and that shows that there are three hundred and 
sixty-four days when you might get un-birthday 
presents..." 
"Certainly," said Alice. 
"And only one for birthday presents, you know. 
There's glory for you!" 
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said. 
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course 
you don't—till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-
down argument.'" Alice objected. 
"When / use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a 
rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to 
mean—neither more nor less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make 
words mean so many different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to 
be master—that's all." 
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything; so after 
a minute Humpty Dumpty began again. "They've a 
temper, some of them—particularly verbs: they're the 
proudest—adjectives you can do anything with, but not 
verbs—however, lean manage the whole lot of them! 
Impenetrability! That's what / say!" 
l 
"Would you tell me, please," said Alice, "what that 
means?" 
"Now you talk like a reasonable child," said Humpty 
Dumpty, looking very much pleased. "I meant by 
'impenetrability9 that we've had enough of that subject, 
and it would be just as well if you'd mention what you 
mean to do next, as I suppose you don't mean to stop here 
all the rest of your life." 
"That's a great deal to make one word mean," Alice 
said in a thoughtful tone. 
"When I make a word do a lot of work like that," 
said Humpty Dumpty, "I always pay it extra." 
"Oh!" said Alice. She was too much puzzled to 
make any other remark. 
"Ah, you should se 4em come round me of a Saturday 
night," Humpty Dumpty went on, wagging his head 
gravely from side to side, "for to get their wages, you 
know." 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass. pp. 268-270, 3rd Ed. (1968). 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW IN APPLYING GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF OPTION LAW RATHER 
THAN THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF 
THE BINDING CONTRACT 
If the assertion by Humpty Dumpty is correct that words must be paid when 
they are worked overtime by making them mean what the speaker wishes, then the 
defendant in her Brief would be deeply indebted to the numerous words she has 
"overworked". 
First, Defendant attempts to transform this highly specialized contract 
between the parties into a run-of-the mill option agreement by citing cases and 
authorities applicable to the normal option agreement. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 6-9). 
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Plaintiff does not dispute any of the legal principles stated by Defendant in this 
elaborate discourse. There is no question but that these general principles of 
option law would clearly support the lower court's decision were it not for the 
unique language contained in this highly technical agreement between the parties. 
None of the authorities cited by Defendant deal with the unique "words" of 
this agreement. For example, the Utah Supreme Court in Geisdorf did not deal 
with a specific clause requiring an affirmative duty on the part of the seller to 
notify the buyer of certain defaults in the exercise of the option. Thus, this broad 
generalization attempted by the appellee is of no value in an analysis of the 
contract in the instant case. 
Second, it is apparent from examination of all of the provisions of this 
contract that this is not a run-of-the mill option agreement found in Defendant's 
authorities. For example, while the purchase price of an acre of land is defined as 
$6,500 pursuant to paragraph 1 of the agreement, paragraph 5(b) provides that the 
initial payments would be at 125 percent of the purchase price. Under the 
undisputed facts of this case, Plaintiffs predecessor in interest had exercised the 
option in the past and had purchased approximately 11.5 acres of the property for 
$93,386. Plaintiff also exercised the option in the past and purchased 
approximately 14.17 acres for $115,155. Therefore, approximately 25.67 acres 
had been purchased for $208,542 at this $8,125 rate required by paragraph 5(b) of 
the agreement. 
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Thus, at the time the parties entered into the present dispute it was 
undisputed that Plaintiff had overpaid the defendant $41,704 for the property 
Plaintiff had in its actual possession. The parties stipulated before the lower court 
that this credit entitled the plaintiff to select another 6.4 acres of property even 
assuming that the entire agreement had been terminated by Plaintiffs failure to 
timely exercise the option. It is obvious that the structure of this agreement did not 
fit the definition of a normal option contract since in such cases there is no 
ongoing relationship between the optionor and optionee once the option has not 
been exercised. Clearly, under a normal option agreement neither party has any 
further duty to the other once the option has expired. 
Moreover, paragraph 6(b) speaks in terms of a 'termination of the 
agreement'' which goes beyond the scope of any normal option. This paragraph 
states: 
Buyer may, at any time, give Seller written notice that Buyer has 
elected to terminate this agreement. As of the expiration of the Term or any 
sooner termination of this agreement (whether as a result of notice given 
pursuant to the immediately preceding sentence or for any other reason), 
Buyer may elect to apply some or all of such excess monies and/or any 
consideration paid by Buyer to Seller pursuant to paragraph 3 (to the extent 
that such consideration has not previously been credited to Buyer in any 
prior closing) to the purchase of any portion of the property not purchased 
as mtf the day of such expiration or sooner termination. Buyer shall set forth 
such election in a writing delivered to Seller, and Seller shall promptly 
comply with the election made by Buyer. 
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This paragraph clearly creates a duty for the seller to perform an act after 
the contract has ended regardless of how it is terminated. This is far from the 
norm of a hornbook option agreement. 
Third, with this in mind it now remains to examine the "words" of 
paragraph 3 of the contract. Appellee concedes that if Plaintiff failed to pay the 
consideration required for the extension that a default notice from Defendant 
would have been required. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 10-11). Appellee then argues, 
"But that wording presumes that there is a notice to extend and some failure to 
send or provide the required funds with the notice." Appellee clearly ignores the 
"words" contained in the last paragraph of paragraph 3 which defines "default or 
failure concerned" to "including, without limitation, that Buyer has failed to timely 
pay the Seller any consideration for the extension of the term." 
The term "without limitation" clearly indicates other conditions aside from 
lack of payment. If the actual notice of extension is excluded from triggering 
Defendant's duty to notify Plaintiff for cure, what other failures would be 
included? Plaintiff was obligated to send written notice to the defendant of its 
desire to exercise the option and to pay for that exercise. Certainly, failure to send 
notice must necessarily be a defined failure "without limitation" or the entire 
phrase is meaningless. Appellee wishes this Court to rewrite the paragraph to only 
apply for failure to "timely pay to Seller any consideration for the extension of the 
term." 
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The reason for this unique language requiring an affirmative duty on the 
part of the seller was to protect the interest of the buyer who was accelerating 
payment for the initial purchases of the property at 125 percent of the value. Since 
the defendant in this case had already been prepaid over $41,000 by the plaintiff 
and its predecessors, it was clearly a bargained for provision that the buyer receive 
protection from any inadvertent failure to comply with the terms of the contract. 
This prepayment of the purchase price clearly benefited the defendant who had the 
use of this money prior to when it would normally be due. In exchange, Plaintiff 
required the defendant to notify it and give it the opportunity to cure any perceived 
default or failure to protect Plaintiffs interests under the contract. 
Fourth, Appellee maintains that there was a failure to pay the funds 
required regardless of the lack of notice given to the defendant. (Appellee's Brief, 
p. 11). This assertion is clearly incorrect since it is clear from paragraph 5 of the 
agreement that the "payments" described are for the actual purchase of an acre of 
land and not for the mere privilege of exercising the agreement. The Affidavits of 
Kent Buie (R. 160-61) and George Buzinias (R. 178-80) are uncontradicted that 
the previous purchases in accordance with paragraph 3 of the agreement did not 
include any "fee" but was merely the purchase price of an acre of land at the 125 
percent price of $8,125. Since Plaintiff already had a credit of over $40,000 at the 
time this option would have been exercised, it had currently met the requirement 
6 
for payment and there was no requirement of any further tender of payment as 
now claimed by the defendant. 
Finally, the undisputed conduct of the parties also supports Plaintiffs 
interpretation of this agreement. If the defendant truly believed that the agreement 
had terminated in 1994 when no notice had been received from the plaintiff, 
Defendant was obligated to tender the prepaid land to the plaintiff in accordance 
with the termination provisions of the contract. This was not done and, in fact, 
Plaintiff had to aggressively seek specific performance from the court in order to 
enforce the obligation to convey the additional 6 acres of property. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has previously cited case law and authority regarding the 
interpretation of contracts by courts. (Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 10-12). 
Paragraph 14 of the contract itself states, "This agreement shall be construed 
according to its fair meaning and not strictly for or against seller or buyer, as if 
both seller and buyer had prepared it." Plaintiff submits that this "fair meaning" 
can only be determined by reading the entire agreement as a whole and focusing 
on the interaction of the various requirements of both parties. 
While Defendant wishes to pick and choose these provisions and to 
transform this agreement into a hornbook option agreement such effort cannot be 
allowed without contorting both the words of the contract and the conduct of the 
parties. Defendant agrees that normally the seller of property is under no 
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affirmative obligation when the buyer fails to correctly notify the seller of the 
exercise of an option. Likewise, however, it is not normal for a buyer to pay 125 
percent of the value of the land and to give the seller a windfall credit during the 
pendency of the agreement. Both of these exceptions were negotiated by the 
parties and both parties are now bound by the uniqueness of this contract and 
cannot rely upon general principles of option law. 
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court fell into the trap of 
superficial hornbook analysis and therefore failed to correctly analyze the correct 
obligations and duties required by this specific document. Arsuch, therefore, the 
decision of the lower court should be reversed and judgment should be entered on 
behalf ofPlaintiff. 
DATED this 16th day of September, 1998. 
k 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
3645 East Cascade Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah £4109 
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